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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the role of the emergency department in planning for mass 
casualties during an emergency. The demand on hospital emergency departments has 
stretched the capacity for normal operations beyond their original design. Hospital surge 
capacity is not only complex, but affects every hospital emergency department in the 
country. Factors, such as hospital bed capacity, surge levels, staffing and the use of 
volunteers in time of emergency, all play a critical role in the ability and accessibility of 
the hospital to react during time of need. 
The recommendations provided are based on the analysis of county, state and 
federal plans along with case studies that provide a varied approach to emergency 
preparedness and the role of the hospital, focus on some of the facets of preparedness and 
the immediate need for emergency planning, training/exercising and communication in 
hospitals across America, and specifically, in hospitals in South Carolina.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Hospital emergency departments (ED) throughout the United States (U.S.) serve 
as the first stop for millions of patients per year. They provide an extraordinary service on 
an all-day and year-round basis. It is imperative, therefore, that those hospitals know how 
to best deal with the large numbers of victims entering their facilities via the emergency 
departments within a short period of time. 
As a result of the Madrid bombings of 2004, and the large number of casualties in 
that attack, a survey was developed by the U.S. House of Representatives to ask Level I 
trauma centers in seven major cities in the United States to determine whether they have 
the capacity to respond to the level of casualties that Madrid experienced during the 
bombings. 
The survey found that emergency rooms across the nation were terribly 
overcrowded on a daily basis. Many are already diverting patient to other hospitals to try 
to alleviate this issue. The nation is not adequately prepared for a medical surge on the 
scale of a Madrid bombing or a Hurricane Katrina.  
South Carolina hospitals mimic the nation’s dismal national findings. South 
Carolina ranks 32nd in the number of emergency departments per one million people;1 
however, in reality, is not prepared to accept large numbers of patients in its emergency 
departments. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast and caused catastrophic 
wind damage and flooding, and is listed as one of the worst disasters in the nation’s 
history.2 The healthcare system was desperately unprepared for the influx of patients and 
other serious problems. Other problems encountered included patient flow issues, 
                                                 
1 Roger Jay Lewis, “Statement,” American College of Emergency Physicians, Department of 
Emergency Medicine, UCLA Medical Center, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
May 5, 2008. 
2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health 
and Medical Response, by Sarah A. Lister, CRS Report RL33096 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, September 21, 2005). 
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medical record access, access to other departments, such as laboratory, billing, and others 
during all hours of the day and night, the lack of nursing staff in particular, and lack of 
healthcare staff, in general. Other issues can include the volunteer’s role and how to use 
volunteers during an emergency, needed equipment, storage of personal protective 
equipment (PPE), pharmaceutical caches, and legal issues. These issues have affected 
emergency departments across the nation.  
Over 114 million patients seek treatment in EDs nationally each year. Some are 
rushed there with severe illnesses and others need immediate care, but many others arrive 
with less acute issues. For many people in the country, the ED is their primary healthcare 
entry point, although they know it may take hours to be seen by a doctor. The result is 
EDs stretched to their capacity on a daily basis, and often they are ill prepared for large-
scale disasters. Most EDs were not built to hold 120 to 140 patients at a time. At the same 
time, most hospitals in the nation have chosen not to invest funds to expand their EDs, or 
cannot obtain approval for expansion from regulatory agencies.  
An area of deep concern regarding mass-casualty events is the decontamination of 
patients prior to their entry in EDs. “OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First 
Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous 
Substances,” from January 20053 explains the hospital’s role in decontamination and 
makes practical recommendations for factors that play a role in the decontamination of 
patients. This document serves as the best practice for decontamination for first receivers, 
and is used by hospital associations and hospitals across the country as the leading 
document for the decontamination of patients. The basic principles and concepts from 
this document can also apply to mobile facilities and to temporary shelters, and serve as a 
guideline for an incident that involves thousands of victims. Hospitals around the country 
rely on this document as their major planning tool for decontamination, since the Joint  
 
 
                                                 
3 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First 
Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances,” 
January 2005, http://www.osha.gov/dts/osta/bestpractices/html/hospital_firstreceivers.html. 
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Commission does not require hospitals to have a medical surge plan, or specifically, a 
decontamination plan for their facility. Many times, the facility’s emergency operations 
plan or emergency preparedness plan briefly covers this topic. 
Several elements that play a role in mass casualty readiness include incident 
command and control, legal issues, personnel, use of volunteers, security, budget for 
department, equipment, patient monitoring systems, overcrowding, and a lack of 
qualified individuals to run the decontamination capability around the clock. 
Although numerous elements involve hospitals and their capacity to deal with 
mass casualties, decontamination is the one element that can clearly shut down a hospital 
faster than any other element. Exposure to chemical, biological, or radiological materials 
when hospitals receive patients contaminated with these substances during mass-casualty 
incidents is the threat that affects hospitals the majority of the time, rather than the 
decontamination of patients with infectious diseases. The group of individuals who are 
first responders, such as firefighters, and law enforcement, as discussed in the problem 
statement section of this proposal, face many concerns regarding hospital EDs and their 
ability to serve patients who arrive during a mass-casualty event. Hospitals are 
increasingly worried that the sheer numbers of patients that could arrive for treatment 
may overload the system enough to not be able to provide safe, quality service. South 
Carolina hospitals have the same problems as hospitals nationally experience concerning 
a number of issues EDs face. 
Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams and ambulance personnel are the first line 
of defense when transporting patients to hospital EDs. The assumption is that patients 
ideally are decontaminated prior to arriving at the local ED, which limits the quantity of 
substance arriving at the hospital. First receivers are the personnel in the following roles: 
clinicians other than ED personnel, and hospital staff from a number of areas: security, 




As hospitals struggle with the issues of overcrowding and how to decontaminate 
large numbers of patients during a mass-casualty event, the significant challenge of this 
thesis is to recommend strategies for South Carolina hospital EDs specific enough to be 
incorporated into hospital emergency plans, and yet, remain flexible enough to be utilized 
by any size hospital in the state. 
Although the next incident may not be predicted, or planned, it is the 
responsibility of hospitals to have available the tools to ensure the best healthcare 
possible to all victims. The consequence of not having strategies in place for hospitals is 
ultimately the loss of life due to not being prepared. Hospitals do not have the luxury to 
imagine what to do IF another disaster occurs, but rather be prepared to treat large 
numbers of casualties in their EDs.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How should hospitals determine which needs a facility has for dealing with mass 
casualty events and how do they assess their risk level for their facility? 
Which policy recommendations for the decontamination process can be put into 
place for South Carolina hospital EDs to prepare actively for a mass-casualty event?  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature available on the thesis topic is varied and broad. The sub-literatures 
or categories are: 1) government documents, especially since 2001, which focus on 
preparedness as a whole, 2) hospital best practices that have emerged in the last 10 years, 
3) research on large-scale events that have shaped hospital preparedness and response 
beginning with SARS, the Tokyo Sarin attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing , 9/11, and 
Hurricane Katrina, and 4) GAO reports and OSHA recommendations for the 
decontamination of patients prior to entering hospital EDs. 
A. NATIONAL REPORTS, STRATEGIES, AND OTHER GOVERNMENT 
DOCUMENTS 
The Hospital Emergency Surge Capacity: Not Ready for the “Predictable 
Surprise”4 document published by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform illustrates the snapshot in time survey of hospital 
preparedness at a given time in the United States. The survey represents what many 
people had suspected: hospitals across the nation are not prepared to accept a large 
number of casualties through their EDs at any given time. This survey was based on the 
numbers of casualties experienced in Madrid, Spain and is an example of how U.S. 
hospitals are not ready for a medical surge through their EDs at any point in time, under 
normal circumstances. The estimated number of casualties that could report to an ED at 




                                                 
4 Committee on Oversight and Governments Reform, Hospital Emergency Surge Capacity; Not Ready 
for the “Predictable Surprise” (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2008). 
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Other government documents including the 9/11 Commission Report,5 and the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Target Capability List,”6 describe preparedness 
as an essential capacity for the United States. The “Target Capability List” takes aspects 
of preparedness and defines the capability, and then breaks down preparedness measures 
into statements with metrics to answer yes/no to, and then drills down to critical tasks that 
need to be accomplished to complete the task.7  
In the 9/11 Commission Report, the document speaks to the evolution of 
counterterrorism, and although does not specifically mention hospital capability, does 
speak to other terrorism events and how agencies have had to adapt to the new terrorism.8 
These government reports and strategies lay the groundwork for preparedness in the 
United States post 9/11, which has also impacted the manner in which hospitals have had 
to prepare to accept patients in their facilities. Planning for hospitals has been partly 
based on the recommendations from the government reports and strategies. Flaws in the 
literature include recommendations that are generally vague in nature, and seem to be 
removed from the real life of hospital EDs across the nation. 
A recent GAO report indicated states are planning for medical surge, but may 
need to share medical resources. The report focused on the Hospital Preparedness 
Program 2006 Mid Year Reports to chart some of the sentinel indicators of the program 
to help determine the hospital capacity for EDs in time of surge.9  
                                                 
5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 2004. 
6 Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, Office of Justice Programs, 
“United States Department of Homeland Security, Target Capability List: Version 1.1.,” May 23, 2005, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TCL1_1.pdf. 
7 Ibid. 
8 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report. 
9 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Preparedness: States are Planning for Medical 
Surge, but Could Benefit from Shared Guidance for Allocating Scarce Medical Resources (GAO-08-668), 
Washington, DC: GPO, 2008.  
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B. BEST PRACTICES  
EDs throughout the nation are dangerously overcrowded. Delays in being treated 
and in being dispatched speedily to the intensive care units means patients are less likely 
to survive. The chronic shortfall of funds has also been an impediment the last few 
decades for EDs. One possible solution to these problems is a new project called, “Project 
ER One,” a model for EDs based on 10 years of planning from input from top national 
and international experts. Washington Hospital Center is one of the hospitals that 
received and treated victims of the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax scare. Components of the 
project include digitizing medical records, and mounting computer screens in locations to 
have patient information available that assist with reducing waiting times significantly in 
the hospital studied. Hospital space must be utilized both inside the walls and outside 
hospital walls by having decontamination areas, ambulance ramps, and triage areas set 
aside for treatment. Hospitals are transforming their space to better prepare for medical 
surge and large numbers of patients entering their doors. Some hospitals are proposing 
unique solutions to complicated space and many are expanding their hospital surge 
capacity without spending millions of dollars.  
As stated in Chapter I, decontamination is of deep concern. OSHA’s document 
“OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty 
Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances,” from January 2005 addresses 
this topic.10 
C. LARGE-SCALE WORLD EVENTS 
Events, such as SARS, the Sarin gas attacks in Japan, the Oklahoma City 
bombings, 9/11, and Hurricane Katrina, have shaped and reshaped the healthcare system 
internationally. In these specific attacks, healthcare workers and the healthcare system 
were tested. As these events unfolded, healthcare was stressed to the maximum primarily 
through the arrival of large numbers of patients at hospitals EDs within a short period of 
time. In the case of the Madrid, Spain bombings, over 2,000 patients presented 
                                                 
10 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First 
Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances.”  
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themselves to 15 local hospitals. Similar stories emerged from other large-scale world 
events. SARS impacted healthcare workers and the system became crippled due to the 
lack of healthcare workers able to work, as well as due to sickness.  
Then Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the United States and left 
unprecedented devastation along the coast that affected not only healthcare, but also 
caused economic destruction. One year after the hurricane, a White House report was 
released with lessons learned and how the nation will be better prepared for future 
disasters. Hurricane Katrina was the stimulus for the federal government to take action 
regarding resources in the form of tax relief, FEMA providing grants to the areas, relief 
to homeowners and businesses in the area and money for the levees, and floodwall 
protection. Federal response was heavily criticized for the lack of emergency meals, and 
ice, and staff to take care of injured patients. Evacuation to hospitals was also criticized 
along with the lack of medical care by hospitals to deal with medical issues. The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, February 2006,11 states how this event 
prompted responses from local, state and federal response partners. The extreme 
devastation of this one hurricane has changed the U.S. views, preparedness efforts, and 
response mechanisms to disasters in this nation.  
The Joint Commission requires hospitals to conduct a hazard vulnerability 
analysis to identify events that could affect demand for their services or ability to provide 
those services, the likelihood of those events occurring, and the consequences of those 
events. Hazard vulnerability analysis should be reviewed annually by hospitals. The tool 
developed by the American Society for Healthcare Engineering analysis includes hazard, 
threat and hospital vulnerability in three factors. 
1. Probability of Occurrence: based on the known risk, historical data, 
presence of threat within the geographical community and expert input. 
2. Risk: based on interruption of services, potential for death or injury, and 
property impact. 
                                                 
11 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: The White House, 
February 2006). 
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3. Preparedness Status: based on current level of facility preparedness, 
history of response for similar threats, and the need for the use of outside 
resources.  
All these events have brought a unique set of issues, and challenges to the 
healthcare system, especially patients who enter the healthcare system (hospital) via the 
ED. Medical surge and the expansion of surge are multifaceted, but the focus of this 
thesis is the overcrowding of EDs and the role of the decontamination of patients prior to 
entering the ED.  
 10 
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III. ARGUMENT 
Hospitals should utilize grant monies provided by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services that allots states funds to improve public health preparedness and 
help healthcare facilities respond to emergency situations in which mass casualties occur. 
These funds may be utilized to assist in the cost of effectively managing large numbers of 
patients during these incidences. They may apply the money to preparedness planning, 
personal protective equipment purchases, exercises and education, and training efforts to 
advance the preparedness and capabilities of hospitals to respond to such threats where 
mass casualties are involved. 
Although mass casualty events involve multiple elements at the individual 
hospital level, such as legal issues, personnel roles, use of volunteers, equipment and 
budgetary goals, it is imperative that the focus be on the role of decontamination and the 
initiation of a standardized approach for hospitals to use to ensure an effective patient 
flow through the healthcare system. 
The decontamination procedure of patients entering EDs is a critical function in a 
facility’s ability to manage mass casualties. If not appropriately addressed, it is the single 
most deteriorating element to the flow of patient care in the ED that could potentially 
present cross-contamination issues with healthcare staff, other patients, and equipment. 
Through the evaluation of multiple decontamination approaches from local, state and 
military jurisdictions, it will be evident that this topic is a key facet in the management of 
mass casualties in the ED. 
Literature supports the claim that having hospitals prepared to deal with 
contaminated patients prior to entering the ED will help expedite seeing large numbers of 
patients, without having to stop or slow down their delivery of healthcare to patients, and 
to avoid a preventable closure of the hospital at the time it is most needed. 
 12 
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IV. SIGNIFICANCE RESEARCH  
A. LITERATURE 
An analysis of existing research from multiple decontamination plans will lend 
itself to tangible practices for hospital EDs to apply to their emergency preparedness 
plans. The responsibility hospitals have to balance managing quality healthcare of 
patients and managing large numbers of patients entering EDs during a mass casualty 
event will be enhanced by employing recommendations provided in this thesis. The 
application of fine-tuned research will increase South Carolina’s decontamination 
capabilities in order to meet the demands of threats to this nation’s healthcare system. 
Two guidance documents are well known for a common sense approach to the 
decontamination of patients. The “OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First 
Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous 
Substances” document12 focuses on protection for first receivers during releases of 
chemical, radiological and biological agents that produce victims who may need to be 
decontaminated prior to entry in a hospital ED. The document does focus on mass-
casualty incidents but can also guide hospitals for other events, such as decontamination 
in mobile facilities or shelters. This guidance does not cover situations in which the 
hospital is the site of the release, and it also does not cover decontamination for infectious 
outbreaks.  
The other highly recognized guidance document in the United States, is the 
Veteran’s Administration Hospital Decontamination course13 designed to provide a 
footprint to hospitals on how to evaluate the source of the contaminate, and all the 
elements of a decontamination unit, such as personnel, security, decontamination lines, 
and how to physically decontaminate a person, and so forth. 
                                                 
12 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First 
Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances.” 
13 Department of Veteran’s Affairs, “VHA Decontamination Training Program, Employee Education 
System,” updated August 2008, CD. 
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B. FUTURE RESEARCH EFFORTS  
The significance research will assist South Carolina hospitals plan and prepare 
their individual facilities for mass-casualty events that may occur within the borders of 
the state. This thesis will also outline recommendations that may influence other state 
hospitals to implement more stringent guidelines for decontamination during mass-
casualty events. The knowledge gained through this research will be used to identify 
recommendations on the issues of decontamination to other healthcare facilities in the 
author’s state of South Carolina. She anticipates that these recommendations may also be 
requested by other states around the nation to help prepare their hospitals for the same 
issues facing EDs. This research is just the beginning on the work that needs to be done 
throughout the nation, but it is a starting point for planning for this nation’s vital 
healthcare system. 
C. IMMEDIATE CONSUMER/CUSTOMER 
The immediate consumer or customer of this research will be South Carolina 
hospitals that participate in the Hospital Preparedness Program, sponsored by the 
Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response, under the umbrella of Health and 
Human Services. 
D. HS PRACTITIONERS AND LEADERS NATIONALLY 
The research will assist practitioners in homeland security and hospitals to 
understand the need to have a solid Emergency Preparedness Plan for their hospital and 
for Joint Commission requirements. In addition, hospitals that receive patients from other 
states will have a united method for dealing with overcrowding and decontamination of 
patients who enter their EDs. 
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V.  METHODOLOGY 
Case study methodology is utilized for this thesis, which explores best practices 
because they offer a good cross-section of the methods and types of emergency plans and 
guidelines that address decontamination practices of EDs. By using best practices and 
national guidelines, these practices may be able to be translated into recommendations for 
South Carolina EDs. 
The state of Connecticut has designed a decontamination plan14 that addresses 
chemical, biological, radiological agents and how best to decontaminate patients affected 
by these agents. Its plan focuses on how to mobilize decontamination trailers throughout 
the state to decontaminate a large number of patients at one time.  
The Bridgeport Hospital Emergency Preparedness Decontamination Plan15 is a 
real world example of how a leader in hospital preparedness has taken a proactive 
approach to decontamination for a facility. This thesis reviews its plans for mass-casualty 
events as it relates to the influx of patients in the ED and ways to solve some of the issues 
across the nation’s hospitals. The variable in these plans is personnel used during this 
process and team composition. Each facility determines its standards of decontamination 
including personnel involved in the process. Each plan is evaluated on its specific 
approach to team membership, number of staff on each shift, and the level of protection 
each team member is provided. These best practices illustrate several tactics used by 
hospitals to help prevent, and protect the employees and facilities in this nation’s 
hospitals. They represent a cross section of facilities in this nation that are all facing the 
same issues of how to deal with large numbers of patients entering an ED, and they also 
provide a broad view of the nature and type of threat that they represent and shed a 
glimmer of hope for the facilities in this nation.  
                                                 
14 State of Connecticut Mass Decontamination Mobilization Plan, March 10, 2005.  
15 Bridgeport Hospital Emergency Preparedness Decontamination Plan, State of Connecticut, 
Bridgeport, February 2007.  
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This research analyzes and synthesizes data from existing decontamination plans 
to reviewing national GAO reports on the subject to help determine the shortcomings of 
each of the plans. 
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VI. ANALYSIS CHAPTER 
Measuring emergency preparedness can be difficult, especially since many of the 
parameters to measure these specific elements of preparedness have been developed in 
within the last few years, after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Events, such as these, have 
exposed the inadequacies in the nation’s public health and medical capability to respond 
to terrorist attacks. Within the last several years, the Department of Health and Human 
Services has begun to develop a strategy and parameters improve the nation’s surge 
capacity.  
Healthcare surge capacity refers to the ability to expand medical surge rapidly 
beyond normal operating levels to meet increased demand following an emergency. 
Surge capacity encompasses so many factors that this thesis primarily focuses on the 
hospital beds. 
This chapter focuses on parameters that can be utilized for hospital EDS to use for 
planning for mass casualties. Since the Hospital Preparedness Program is the source of 
funding for hospitals for bioterrorism and all hazards planning, it is important to describe 
how it has changed, modified, and evolved since 2002 when the grant program began the 
cooperative agreement with states. The natural progression of changing emphasis has 
required measuring the parameters differently many years. For instance, in 2005–2006, 
the general obligations of the grantees revolved around developing systems to either 
allow for the registration and credentialing of clinicians to volunteer during an increased 
surge capacity need, develop a system to ensure a sufficient supply of pharmaceuticals to 
provide prophylaxis for three days to hospital personnel, to have enough personal 
protective equipment for healthcare staff, or to ensure that hospitals have the capacity to 
maintain in negative pressure, one case of a highly infectious disease.  
The last section of this portion of the thesis examines the use of volunteers during 
an emergency in three settings since the volunteer program nationally is greatly varied 
and diverse. The American Red Cross has traditionally been the volunteer agency that 
responded to emergencies and has a rich history internationally, and of course, in the 
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United States. After 9/11, the Surgeon’s General Office initiated a volunteer program 
administered by states to recruit, train and credential medical volunteers actively with the 
goal that they could deploy locally, regionally or possibly nationally, to a disaster of any 
magnitude.  
Hospital surge capacity is a complex set of parameters that affect every aspect of 
the hospital. Applications of the Hospital Preparedness Program funding were reviewed 
based on the extent to which the plan relates to identified needs, and how the prioritized 
benchmarks addressed the needs of staffing, equipment and capital improvements. 
Program goals, objectives and activities must show a progression of the program from 
year to year, while having measurable, achievable and sustainable goals and activities. As 
part of this parameter, the federal government required states to build a system that could 
provide triage treatment and initial stabilization, for the following classes of adult and 
pediatric patients requiring hospitalization within three hours in the wake of a terrorism 
incident or other public health emergency. As part of the parameter for states to receive 
federal funding, they had to address and document action steps that addressed Parameter 
1. Some of these actions steps include high-risk scenarios based on a hospital Hazard 
Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) that must be applied to regions to determine if higher 
levels of surge capacity will be necessary, as well as intra-state or multi-state regional 
work plans that must be developed to address mutual aid agreements. Off-site facilities 
(alternate care facilities) must be addressed to include options to minimize the burden of 
hospital facilities. These sites could include mobile facilities, large convention halls, 
armories, and State Fairgrounds. Another action step includes planning for a pediatric 
specific mass casualty event. Parameter 1 specifically addresses hospital bed capacity as 
it relates to specific conditions. 
A. PARAMETERS 
1. Parameter 1: Hospital Bed Capacity: Minimal Level of Readiness: 
Specific Conditions 
• 500 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of acute 
infectious disease, especially smallpox, anthrax, plague, tularemia, and 
influenza 
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• 50 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of acute 
botulism intoxication or other acute chemical poisoning—especially 
resulting from nerve agent exposure 
• 50 cases per million population for patients suffering burn or trauma 
• 50 cases per million population for patients manifesting the symptoms of 
radiation–induced injury, especially bone marrow suppression. 
This parameter has not been revised or adjusted since 2005, and is still used when 
reporting to the federal government. This parameter does include the measurement for 
patients affected with acute infections, burn or trauma, and radiation exposure. All states 
that received Hospital Preparedness Program funding had to develop bed tracking 
capability systems that captured current daily-staffed bed capacity for a variety of bed 
types prior to 2001. Hospitals did not track surge capacity beds in detail as there no 
established system existed to capture this information on a daily basis from hospitals 
across a particular state. Although incidents involving many patients arriving at hospital 
EDs occurred, it was not deemed a high priority locally or nationally. It was not until 
2005 that a parameter for measuring hospital preparedness was introduced by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). As part of the Hospital Preparedness 
Program, it required states to build a system that could provide triage treatment and initial 
stabilization. 
As a result, states are now required to report an inventory of total surge beds, by 
region, and had to reflect beds for patients suffering from specific conditions, including 
pediatric and adult beds. At this time, the focus for bed capacity, surge capacity was 
based on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive attacks. Beds had to be 
identified to handle these patients specifically. Since 2007, the national focus has turned 
toward an all hazard approach to planning, and not specifically focus on these few risks.  
2. Parameter 2: Surge 15–20% Above Baseline Service Levels During a 
Public Health Emergency 
A surge bed ratio consists of 500 adult and pediatric patients per 1,000,000 above 
the current daily-staffed bed capacity. The surge bed ratio was derived from several 
sources: National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) projections, data from trauma 
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regions/systems, systems developed for Mass Casualty Incidents (MCI) and other 
countries (i.e., Israel). This ratio is an extrapolation of several of these models, but seems 
to represent the best ratio for hospitals to follow for planning purposes.  
Although the other planning ratios are important in overall emergency 
preparedness, the surge definition and ratio described above is most pertinent to EDs.  
Although this parameter does focus on current daily bed capacity, it is critical for 
hospitals to consider several additional factors relating to the ability of the hospital to 
meet human resources including staffing needs, patient flow, clinic flow, physical layout 
of the hospital and others.  
Another element in surge capacity often overlooked is the emergency training for 
all medical staff in hospitals. In 2005, another critical benchmark appeared based on 
competency-based education and training programs for adult and pediatric pre-hospital, 
and outpatient healthcare personnel responding to a terrorist incident or other public 
health emergency.  
During this time frame and continued until today, competency-based trainings are 
required and particular attention is given to the two most populated regions of a state for 
which a predictable high-risk scenario has been identified through the HVA. The number 
of personnel in other regions of the state also has to be identified with training given to 
healthcare staff through competency-based programs. Encouraged are elements that 
address the needs of special populations, those that emphasize a regional approach, and 
are coordinated with other state, local and federal drills, and exercises.  
Israel is a good example of how training should be conducted. Individual 
healthcare providers are required to participate in regular training. All paramedics, 
physicians, and nurses have to train at least once each year on convention and non-
conventional mass casualty events. Hospital physicians are required to work emergency 
departments regardless of their area of practice. Physicians from all areas of the hospital 
are called upon in time of emergency to work the ED.  
Hospitals also must make a plan to share resources with other hospitals in a 
geographic region, through Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and contractual 
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arrangements. The Hospital Preparedness Program has focused the efforts on 
partnership/coalition development including the plan to share assets, personnel and 
information. This MOU should be tested through tabletop exercises to help unify the 
ESF-8 management of healthcare during a public health emergency, and integrate 
jurisdictional command in the area.  
3. Parameter 3: Staffing of Healthcare Facilities, Alternate Care 
Facilities, and Other Medical Facilities 
Facilities will have a written response system in place that allows the immediate 
deployment of additional patient care personnel in support of surge bed capacity that 
addresses surge 15–20% above baseline services. 
One computer-staffing model being used is the AHRQ (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality) Staffing Model for Bioterrorism Response16 that describes each of 
these human elements included in hospital surge capacity. The model does provide a 
framework from which to adjust staffing scenarios according to the factors associated 
with the scenario. For instance, a staffing model may look different for a mass 
prophylaxis campaign and a chemical spill at a nearby factory. User input is adjusted 
according to the various features of the event, such as patient flow, people processed 
through the clinic area, and process times. 
B. PLANS 
The analysis of the following medical surge plans provide a framework for 
hospitals to use when writing or revising their emergency plans. Each plan has been 
developed with emergency response partners in mind since all disasters are local, but 
depend on other assets to aid in the response of a mass casualty event. Each medical 
surge plan provides guidance on how public health, the health care system and 
preparedness partners can work together to provide medical surge and response during a 
disaster or catastrophe.  
                                                 
16 AHRQ, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, “Computer Staffing Model for Bioterrorism 
Response,” June 2011 (archived), http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/biomodel.htm.  
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Several plans were selected as models of medical surge planning. These plans 
were chosen a) because they were published and easily assessed on the Internet, b) 
provide a cross section of state and local plans that represent the jurisdictions in the 
United States, and c) individual hospital medical surge plans are generally not published 
for security reasons. 
Each plan is evaluated on the above parameters and scored on a scale of One to 
Five (1–5). A score of 1 means the plan did not address the parameters at all, a score of 3 
means some of the parameters were met but not fully addressed, and a score of 5 means 
the parameters were addressed and the plan is cohesive. 
1. Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Emergency 
Support Function 8: Public Health and Medical Surge Capacity and 
Capability Incident Response Annex 
a. Analysis 
The draft plan is only a few months old (July 2009) and uses assumptions 
to first help define the limits and scope of their plan. The first assumption is that the 
healthcare facilities are reporting extremely large numbers of patients, with either a 
sudden increase in patients arriving at the hospital, or a gradual increase that may peak 
quickly like in the case of a pandemic. The second assumption is that healthcare entities 
and local health departments are reporting high staff absenteeism that could occur either 
in a very short period of time in the case of a mass casualty event, or in the case of a 
pandemic, employees could be exposed early from either persons who are ill, or people 
they come in contact with during the pandemic. In the next assumption, healthcare 
systems are requesting assistance from the state, which means that the incident is moving 
up the tiers and requires more resources. The fourth assumption is the state is moving 
toward requiring additional assets from neighboring states and/or the federal government, 
and is relying on the prior planning assumption tiers. Moreover, the last assumption is 
that the governor or designee has declared a catastrophic health emergency, which would 
require this plan to be activated. It is only in the case of a major disaster or catastrophe 
that the plan would be activated. This state plan also addresses medical surge, and is 
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listed under the section called public health and medical surge. The plan focuses on the 
roles and responsibilities of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene as triggered 
by specific tiers. The responsibilities can be added or modified depending on who the 
response partners are during the scenario. The plan for medical surge focuses on the local 
health departments to provide guidance to individual hospitals and to disseminate public 
health guidance for triage and treatment protocols, sample collection and reporting 
requirements. Communication and collaboration between all partners is the focus of the 
plan, while working closely with the hospitals to assist in the activation and public 
messaging to direct individuals to the appropriate locations to receive care. 
Maryland does describe clearly the difference in capacity and capability. 
Their definitions are as follows, medical surge capability: ability of the system to expand 
rapidly the capacity of the exiting healthcare system to manage patients requiring unusual 
or highly specialized medical evaluation and care.17 The plan does then continue to state 
that most of the events or incidents that Maryland has seen in the past have not tested its 
capability to respond to the maximum capability. A mass casualty incident or influenza 
pandemic would require the support and buy in from the community to develop systems 
to respond effectively.  
• Capability is then described as being more dependent on the nature 
of the incident and the specific resources required to respond. 
Medical surge capability involves issues pertaining to the need for 
special intervention to protect medical providers, patients and the 
integrity of the medical care facility during a public health 
emergency.18 Healthcare workers provide the range of specialized 
medical services needed in excess of what is normally available at 
the location where the emergency is located. Resources needed to 
consider with medical surge capability are the following.  
• Equipment 
• Expertise 
• Incident Management Practices 
• Information  
                                                 
17 “Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Emergency Support Function 8: Public 
Health and Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Incident Response Annex, Draft,” July 2009, 10. 
18 Ibid., 11. 
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• Personnel 
• Procedures and Protocols 
• Supplies 
This plan does follow the National Response Framework document and 
flow chart to coordinate Emergency Support Function 8 resources during a disaster or 
catastrophic incident. Since the National Response Framework is used to design this plan, 
then it naturally is divided into three parts: Prepare, Respond, Recover.  
Section II, which is Respond, has a very strong description of participating 
agencies and their role in the ESF8 function. This section determines roles and 
responsibilities of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, local health 
departments, Hospitals,19 and other partners. The plan offers a guide for activities that 
need to be accomplished under each agency to respond effectively to a disaster or large-
scale emergency.  
b. Parameters 
Although this plan does not specifically address all the medical surge 
capability parameters, the parameters can be analyzed as they relate to individual 
facilities and healthcare institutions.  
(1) Parameter 1: Hospital Bed Capacity: Minimal Level of 
Readiness: Specific Conditions. 
• 500 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of 
acute infectious disease, especially smallpox, anthrax, plague, 
tularemia, and influenza 
• 50 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of 
acute botulism intoxication or other acute chemical poisoning—
especially resulting from nerve agent exposure 
• 50 cases per million population for patients suffering burn or 
trauma  
                                                 
19 “Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Emergency Support Function 8: Public 
Health and Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Incident Response Annex, Draft.” 
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• 50 cases per million population for patients manifesting the 
symptoms of radiation-induced injury, especially bone marrow 
suppression 
• Maryland’s population is 5,633,597 as of 2008, and its licensed 
bed size is 10,323 as of 2006. Therefore, using the parameter of 
minimal level of readiness, the state would have to plan for a range 
of an additional 1,548–2064 patients with symptoms of acute 
infectious disease, especially smallpox, anthrax, plague, tularemia, 
and influenza to be seen through the hospitals. An individual 
hospital would then have to determine the population it serves, the 
counties or the population of the region and take a percentage of 
this number to determine its planning needs. The other parameters 
are based on 50 cases per million, so the same process would apply 
for these parameters. Maryland’s medical surge plan does not 
specifically address surge bed needs per hospital, but hospitals 
within the state of Maryland could easily plan for additional surge 
beds/facility by taking the percentage of the population they serve 
and apply this to the range of additional surge beds needed to 
address their potential surge.  
(2) Parameter 2: Surge 15–20% Above Baseline Service 
Levels During a Public Health Emergency. A Surge Bed Ratio of 500 Adult and Pediatric 
Patients per 1,000,000 Above the Current Daily Staffed Bed Capacity. Maryland’s 
licensed bed capacity is 10,323 as of 2006. Therefore, planning for 15–20% above this 
baseline number would be an additional 1,548–2,064 patients that would need to be 
treated in hospitals across the state during an emergency. Again, an individual hospital 
could take its licensed bed size and then add 15–20% above this number for possible 
surge levels. Although most hospitals do not have the rooms and beds available for this 
type of surge, the need for an alternate care site (ACS) or off-site location is needed. 
These plans include the doubling of patients/room, using cafeterias, hallways, or other 
hospital owned buildings for housing patients during a surge. ACSs or off-site treatment 
centers have different definitions based on the state; thus, it is crucial that hospitals 
within a state clearly understand the meaning of these definitions.  
In the case of Maryland, it has identified alternate care sites in 
relation to purpose of the site, types of patients and scope of care. The purpose of the 
ACS might be for primary triage point, community ambulatory clinic, or a low acuity 
patient care site. The plan also describes the types of surge hospitals: 
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facilities/buildings—non medical buildings that can adapt to surge hospitals and 
proximity to a medical center, mobile medical facilities—hospitals on tractor-trailer 
platforms with surgical and intensive care capabilities, and then portable facilities—that 
are fully equipped, self contained, systems usually stored in a container and based on 
military medical contingency planning.  
(3) Parameter 3: Staffing of Healthcare Facilities, Alternate 
Care Facilities, and Other Medical Facilities. Facilities Will Have a Written Response 
System in Place That Allows the Immediate Deployment of Additional Patient Care 
Personnel in Support of Surge Bed Capacity That Addresses Surge 15–20% Above 
Baseline Services. Although the Maryland Public Health and Medical Surge Capacity and 
Capability Incident Response Annex did not specifically address how many staffing of 
what discipline would be needed to cover a response, it does discuss assumptions during 
a large-scale emergency. For instance, the assumption is that during a pandemic, up to 
20–25% healthcare professionals would be absent from their positions due to sickness. 
The plan also addresses the tools currently available through the AHRQ that has 
developed tools to assist in identifying resources during a hospital surge. The state plan 
then describes the workforce, and methods for enhancing surge through the process of 
activating the Maryland Medical Reserve Corps volunteer and the local medical reserve 
corps. A revision of the clinical model is suggested as one method for expanding surge to 
help reconstruct day-to-day schedules and staffing patterns. A list of other alternative 
solutions that hospitals could use is also provided that includes staff willing to work extra 
shifts, re-deploy clinicians, cross train staff, and so forth. Again, this plan does address 
several of the staffing needs, resources , documentation and communication plans that 
need to be in place especially when addressing alternate care sites. It also lists available 
resources, including federal medical stations, the U.S. Air Force medical support 
package, and tractor trailer units. Maryland has addressed alternate care sites in an 
appendix of the Medical Surge Plan.  
Activating mutual aid agreements to request additional resources 
through the State Emergency Operations Center or the Maryland Department of Health 
and Mental Health Emergency Operations Center is also provided in this annex. 
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The Maryland Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Incident 
Response Index does address scenarios to national planning scenarios. Many of these 
scenarios do plan for large-scale medical emergencies that would require a significant 
increase in hospital admissions and maximize available resources and the increased need 
for surge capacity before and during an event. Using the parameters of minimal levels of 
readiness does fit into its current assumptions in the plan. Individual hospitals within 
Maryland could take the parameters and dovetail them with the medical surge plan to 
form a comprehensive plan that would assist hospital EDs with their planning for mass 
casualties. All five planning assumptions made by Maryland impact hospitals either 
directly or indirectly. Thus, they help define the limits and scope of the plan. The overall 
metric score would be a 3.5. 
2. New Hampshire Plan 
The State of New Hampshire Medical Surge Guidelines from October 2006 
describes medical surge capacity and capability, and provides guidance for medical surge 
planning in the state of New Hampshire. The plan is to be prepared for emergencies that 
generate victims requiring medical treatment that surpass the normal resource capacity 
and/or capabilities of the state of New Hampshire.20  
a. Capability and Capacity 
This plan also addresses all-hazards and defines hospital surge capability 
and capacity as the following. 
• Hospital Surge Capability: Ability of hospitals to use the physical 
and human resources necessary efficiently and appropriately to 
meet an increased demand for medical care. Hospital surge 
capability is described in Tier 1. 
• Hospital Surge Capacity: Quantifiable amount of hospital 
resources and services (i.e., staff, equipment and space) available 
to meet an increased demand for medical care. Hospital surge 
capacity is described in Tier 1.  
                                                 
20 New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, “The State of New Hampshire Medical 
Surge Guidelines,” October 2006, 4, http://www.nhha.org/index-nhha.php?nhha. 
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The plan then continues to describe medical surge capability and capacity 
as the following. 
• Medical Surge Capability: Ability of an affected community or 
region to use physical and human resources appropriately in 
emergencies that overwhelm the normal medical infrastructure. It 
entails augmenting both non-ambulatory and ambulatory care. 
• Medical Surge Capacity: Quantifiable amount of community or 
regional resources and services available for providing medical 
care in emergencies that overwhelm the normal medical 
infrastructure (through numbers or types of patients or loss of 
infrastructure). Medical surge capacity encompasses both hospital 
and community-based surge capacity efforts and, as such, entails 
augmenting both non-ambulatory and non-ambulatory care.21  
The state of New Hampshire uses the Medical Surge Capacity and 
Capability (MSCC) principles of emergency management and the National Incident 
Management System. New Hampshire has adopted the tier system for providing structure 
to the guidance and also outlines responsibility among response agencies. Several 
considerations for planning at all tiers entails including the diverse population density, 
from dense urban areas to rural areas, including the borders of Canada, Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Vermont, as well as including a portion of the state into the Boston 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) for planning, seasonal population changes, and 
special needs populations. The tiered system ranges from Tier 1 that is the individual 
healthcare facility to Tier 6, federal support to the state. The state is also divided into All-
Hazards Planning Regions (AHR), in conjunction with Regional Coordinating 
Committees (RCC) that oversees planning efforts. The RCC also propose changes to the 
alignment of the AHR, as well as oversee a process for municipalities to demonstrate 
their commitment to process by signing a MOU.  
b. Analysis  
The New Hampshire plan does make recommendations specific to surge 
for both hospitals and other acute facilities. For example, each region will build and 
                                                 
21 New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, “The State of New Hampshire Medical 
Surge Guidelines,” 7–8. 
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maintain a capacity to surge 50 community-based beds using the Acute Care Center 
(ACC) design. In a region that has 75,000 residents or more, the recommendation is to 
build and maintain a capacity based on the ratio of 1 community surge bed per 1,000 
populations by 25 bed increments. The New Hampshire plan also recognizes that hazards 
differ from region to region, which are listed as the minimum standards for extra medical 
care capacity. The plan also does a nice job of refinancing terms with medical surge 
capacity, such as altered standards of care, volunteers and credentialing and information 
technology. Each tier describes the work of the agencies involved and the assignments of 
what should be accomplished through this tier. Although the New Hampshire plan does 
focus on the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in response, it also lists 
the statutes, agency and authority for each law or regulation, which is very helpful to 
have these listed in one location.  
c. Parameters 
(1) Parameter 1: Hospital Bed Capacity: Minimal Level of 
Readiness: Specific Conditions. 
• 500 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of 
acute infectious disease, especially smallpox, anthrax, plague, 
tularemia, and influenza 
• 50 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of 
acute botulism intoxication or other acute chemical poisoning—
especially resulting from nerve agent exposure 
• 50 cases per million population for patients suffering burn or 
trauma. 
• 50 cases per million population for patients manifesting the 
symptoms of radiation–induced injury, especially bone marrow 
suppression 
Again, using the state of New Hampshire population statistics from 
the United States Census Bureau, 2008,22 1,315,809 residents live in New Hampshire. 
For this parameter, take the population and divide by 500 for the infectious diseases, and 
divide by 50 for the other elements, and the state capacity is easily determined. Actually, 
                                                 
22 United States Census Bureau, State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States State 
Rankings, “Resident Population—July 2008,” (n.d.), http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rank01.html. 
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the New Hampshire Medical Surge Guidelines23 use the statistics from the 2005 
population per region and determine the bed capacity for each region. The planning has 
already been done and published. Therefore, it would only be necessary to update this 
plan, since it already addresses the parameters of medical surge planning. 
(2) Parameter 2: Surge 15–20% Above Baseline Service 
Levels During a Public Health Emergency. A Surge Bed Ratio of 500 Adult and Pediatric 
Patients per 1,000,000 Above the Current Daily Staffed Bed Capacity. The New 
Hampshire Hospital Association published its updated report in December 200924 listing 
3,020 licensed beds in New Hampshire. Using the surge model of 15–20%, an additional 
453–604 beds would be required to be available during an emergency. Since the state 
plan addresses bed capacity of hospitals, another column could be added to cover the 15–
20% surge for future planning. Since this plan addresses both medical surge capacity and 
hospital surge capacity, the plan is an excellent example of how a state or healthcare 
facility uses data to determine medical surge needs in times of an emergency. It also 
addresses the needs of the community, rather than just bed capacity of hospitals, which is 
a forward way of thinking that other states could adopt. This plan also identifies an aspect 
of medical surge planning that has not yet been mentioned specifically. The relationship 
with the hospital association in each state can be varied and unique. For instance, in some 
states, the hospital associations are really the conduit of funding between the state agency 
receiving funds and the individual hospitals. In some states, the relationship is slightly 
different, in which they are really the liaison between the state agency and hospitals while 
not controlling the money for individual hospitals. The hospital associations in this case 
published very useful data that both the state and individual hospitals could use for state 
medical surge planning, as well as individual hospitals planning. The hospital 
associations must meet standards related to emergency planning, and emergency  
 
 
                                                 
23 New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services. “The State of New Hampshire Medical 
Surge Guidelines,” 20. 
24 Foundation for Healthy Communities New Hampshire Hospital Association in Collaboration with 
National Center for Rural Health Works, “The Economic Impact of Hospital Systems in New Hampshire,” 
December 2009, 15. 
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management for hospitals within their states. Therefore, it is advantageous for state 
agencies to develop, foster and maintain a close working relationship with their 
respective hospital associations.  
(3) Parameter 3: Staffing of healthcare facilities, alternate care 
facilities, and other medical facilities. Facilities will have a written response system in 
place that allows the immediate deployment of additional patient care personnel in 
support of surge bed capacity that addresses surge 15–20% above baseline services. 
The staffing of healthcare facilities is also addressed. The New 
Hampshire plan does include a table that identifies the class of employee, i.e., physician, 
RN, case manager, social worker, etc and indicates staffing levels per 12-hour shifts for a 
50-bed alternate care center. This planning scenario has used 50-patients/hour in 12-hour 
shifts within the ACC. The model used for this planning scenario was based on the Rocky 
Mountain Bioterrorism (RMBT) working group. This model was developed in 2002 as a 
beginning for surge planning. The model is not without flaws. This published model does 
fail to consider additional staff that would be vital to sustain operations within an ACC 
and may not directly participate in medical aspects of patient care. These providers would 
include dietary, housekeeping, and others who provide support as ancillary services. The 
other piece of this parameter that New Hampshire addresses in its plan is the need to have 
job action sheets, or job descriptions for each staff member, which is an extremely critical 
aspect of staffing, since each individual needs to know specifically what role to assume 
during an emergency.  
This plan, like the New Hampshire plan, also focuses on the tier 
response system, along with clearly explaining hospital responsibilities in each of the 
tiers. This plan is also easy to read and describes the role of the hospital. It probably 
works well, since the state is small and does not have hundreds of hospitals to coordinate. 
Using the three parameters, the plan would receive 4 out of 5 for a metric score. This plan 
really addresses the needs of the community and does an excellent job on defining terms 
used in the plan. The state plan leaves flexibility for individual hospitals to expand their 
capability, while including the community needs through medical surge capacity. This 
unique approach to planning is one that can be used by other states for emergency 
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preparedness, and particularly, surge capacity. This plan highlights the relationships 
made in a smaller state with both private and public entities including the hospital 
association. The strong-tiered approach to planning is evidenced by the local, state and 
regional approach to planning.  
3. The Arlington Public Health and Medical Services (PHMS) Surge 
Plan 
The Arlington Plan has a slightly different approach in its surge plan compared to 
the two state plans of Maryland and New Hampshire.  
a. Analysis 
Arlington County is located in close proximity to Washington, DC and 
serves as a joint planner and responder to events, especially in large-scale events. This 
surge plan includes large appendices that include best practices, legal authorities, 
operational tools, and contact lists. Also integrated is a listing of surge facilities including 
their bed capacity during non-emergency situations, additional resources available in a 
surge situation, and the plan for each healthcare facility to surge and to what percent 
above normal staffed bed capacity. Each healthcare facility has a surge plan, summarized 
in one paragraph, to indicate what steps the facility will take during a surge situation. The 
surge plan is applicable to any type of mass casualty, natural disaster or emerging 
infectious disease incident with actual or anticipated casualty numbers or types that 
challenge the regular medical infrastructure of the county. This plan is based on a 
partnership between relevant government and community agencies with all their 
resources combined. Neither sector has the resources or surge capacity to respond to 
emergencies of large magnitude. The purpose of the medical surge plan is to provide 
operation level, all hazards guidance for the Emergency Operations Center where public 
health and medical surge events would happen. The scope of the plan is to prepare for 
response assumptions for incidents that involve large numbers of patients, strategic and 
tactical considerations for Public Health and ESF-8 partners, resource management 
considerations, mutual aid guidance, and integration considerations with other state and 
federal entities and other emergency operation plans related to medical surge.  
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The Arlington Surge Plan does not include the tiered structure, since it is 
focused on the response area and relevant response partners surge plans, which is an 
example of how a local public health plan can be very effective in its response to a 
natural or man-made disaster affecting the local jurisdiction. The plan does not address 
the parameters described in this chapter, but hospitals can take the valuable information 
from the plan and incorporate their data into these parameters. For instance, Arlington 
County has organized its plan into operational areas of readiness, such as roles for surge 
command and control staff, triage system and protocols, and equipment and supplies, 
which is not normally addressed in state medical surge plans. This county plan also 
addresses the telephone triage system model, which is valuable to hospitals and other first 
responders. To utilize the parameters in this chapter, individual hospitals must analyze 
their numbers and plan accordingly. Again, this plan does address the emergency/disaster 
related authorities including the law number and a brief description of each law as it 
relates to emergency/disasters. It also defines the types of surge capacity by levels Level I 
facility (internal surge), Level II lateral or inter-district mutual aid and mobilization, 
Level 3 inter-state mutual aid, and Level 4 state request for federal support. The plan 
provides specific staffed bed capacity for each of these levels of surge capacity.  
The Virginia Hospital System, Arlington Health System has a total bed 
capacity of 2,493 as of 2008, which includes Arlington County’s 342 licensed beds, the 
City of Alexandra’s 355 licensed beds, Fairfax County’s 1,343 licensed beds, and then 
Loudoun and Prince William Counties’ 453 licensed beds.  
b. Parameters 
(1) Parameter 1: Hospital Bed Capacity: Minimal Level of 
Readiness: Specific Conditions. 
• 500 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of 
acute infectious disease, especially smallpox, anthrax, plague, 
tularemia, and influenza 
• 50 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of 
acute botulism intoxication or other acute chemical poisoning—
especially resulting from nerve agent exposure 
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• 50 cases per million population for patients suffering burn or 
trauma 
• 50 cases per million population for patients manifesting the 
symptoms of radiation–induced injury, especially bone marrow 
suppression. 
The population of Arlington County as of 2008 is 209,969, 
according to the United States Census Bureau, from 2008.25 Therefore, using the 
parameter for infectious disease, the county would have to plan for 419 infectious 
patients in its local hospitals to be seen during a public health emergency. Just like the 
state plans, an individual hospital would then look at the population it serves, its current 
bed size, and then determine what percentage of the 419 patients would be seen per 
hospital. This planning ideally would be done in conjunction with public health and other 
hospitals to help determine the needs of the county.  
(2) Parameter 2: Surge 15–20% Above Baseline Service 
Levels During a Public Health Emergency. A Surge Bed Ratio of 500 Adult and Pediatric 
Patients per 1,000,000 Above the Current Daily-Staffed Bed Capacity.  
Arlington County uses the upper range of medical surge in its plan 
as it uses 20% of the staffed bed capacity in Virginia to plan for surge. The plan involves 
the redistribution and maximization of staffed hospital beds in the Commonwealth, it 
incorporates the activation procedures to provide a rapid in-patient intake capability 
through the utilization of vacant, staffed beds, and the expedited discharge of patients 
who meet the criteria for discharge, and includes a timeframe of 0 to 4 hours to activate 
its Level I surge.  
Using the Hospital Preparedness Program data from the last 
several years, each state has the baseline numbers of hospital beds licensed for each 
facility, as well as the surge beds expected through the state. This number should be 15–
20% surge above normal daily bed count. Since the total licensed beds for the Virginia 
Hospital System, Arlington Health System is 2,493, its surge numbers would range from 
374-499 surge beds needed during times of an emergency.  
                                                 
25 United States Census Bureau, State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States State 
Rankings, “Resident Population—July 2008.” 
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(3) Parameter 3: Staffing of Healthcare Facilities, Alternate 
Care Facilities, and Other Medical Facilities. Facilities will have a written response 
system in place that allows the immediate deployment of additional patient care 
personnel in support of surge bed capacity that addresses surge 15–20% above baseline 
services. 
Although the Arlington Public Health and Medical Surge Plan 
does not specifically address numbers of medical staff needed for surge, an Appendix 
does describe surge response partners’ surge plans and descriptions of partners’ 
capabilities. This parameter is the strength of this plan, as each of the response partners 
have a detailed plan of their assets, and what they bring to medical surge related to 
services, hours of operation, contact information and responsibilities of the healthcare 
center. The plan also identifies a situational assessment tool that refers to staffing needs 
of various professions, as well as a notification to community human services agencies.  
The metric score for this plan would be a 3.0 since actual 
parameters for this analysis were not identified, but the plan does detail the response 
partners’ responsibilities and contact information. Arlington includes a great amount of 
detail with its Appendix, and especially concerning the operational tools, and the three 
surge models. This plan is an excellent example of how to reach both the public and 
healthcare workers and public health using different tools. Sometimes one model is not 
the best for all scenarios or group of individuals. Arlington is part of the National Capitol 
Region that has a very robust medical surge plan. Therefore, the best practices, models 
and contacts for the geographic region are the focus.  
Each of these plans, whether state or county, is an example of how 
parameters can help with strategic planning for individual hospitals and public health in 
their jurisdiction. The parameters for surge capacity may change in the future, as the 
needs of the nation change, but using specific numbers and percentages in specific surge 
elements, provide an individual facility the tools it needs to plan effectively. These plans 
also have some common themes discussed in the recommendation section. 
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c. Alternate Care Sites 
Arlington has taken another approach to identifying surge beds through 
alternate care sites. They use several models utilized by a hospital in an emergency surge 
situation: a Telephone Triage system, a Community Care Station (CCS), and an Alternate 
Care Facility (ACF). 
(1) Telephone Triage System. The telephone triage system is a 
public health interactive mechanism that assists the public with understanding health 




Table 1.   Telephone Triage System Service Functions26 
Health Information 
Provides disaster and/or disease information to the public and 
providers during and after the crisis to support their ability to 
care for themselves and others. 
Disease/Injury 
Surveillance 
Collects specific data or utilizes already established databases to 




Utilizes clinical algorithms or decision trees to support the 
management of caller reported symptoms. Levels of clinical 
decision support depend on the scope of practice of the person 
answering the phone. Non-clinicians may provide information to 
callers to allow them to make their own healthcare decisions. 
Quarantine and 
Isolation Support 
Monitor the compliance, health status and resource needs of 
those assigned to home quarantine and isolation. 
Quarantine applies to those exposed to a contagious illness and 
who may be infected but are not yet ill. Quarantine is an 
effective way to protect the public and stop the spread of illness. 
Isolation is the separation and restriction of movement of ill 
people to stop the spread of that illness to others. Care can occur 




Provides drug information, e.g., pill identification, as well as the 
collection of adverse drug events, related to large-scale 




Recognizes individuals with mental health needs; provides 
referrals to community resources where appropriate and 
incorporates any post-event government agency directives (i.e., 
surging community mental health status per the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC)). 
Mass Risk 
Communication 
Utilizes general informational messages distributed by 
government and community leaders via the media (i.e., public 
service announcements, radio bulletins, television “crawlers,” 





                                                 
26 Arlington County Health and Medical Services Surge Plan, Telephone Triage System Model, 
Appendix 6, March 2009.  
 38 
(2) Community Care Station (CCS) Model. The CCS model is 
designed as a first-level surge response to an expanding emergency incident. The purpose 
is to create a community-based response to complement health care that may be 
occurring within the community through private physicians, urgent or clinical care 
centers or other non-profit health care groups. In addition, in a surge response situation, 
hospitals will be looking for a community resource to manage the less infirm. Depending 
on the severity of the public health event, the CCS can initially be established mainly as 
an information center. It can offer a safe venue for public information, as well as address 
questions and concerns specific to the local community.  
A unique feature of the CCS is that the ideal structure for this low 
acuity care service system will reflect the composition of the community. It will be a 
public-private partnership whereby appropriate staffing from both the government and 
the community will staff and operate the center in partnership with the public health 
division. 
(3) Alternate Care Facility (ACF). The ACF model is designed 
as a surge response to an expanding emergency incident. A major purpose of the ACF is 
to free up space and decrease demand at the Virginia Hospital Center once it has 
maximized the use of its existing bed capacity and available resources within its 
Healthcare Facility Surge Area (HFSA) and the surrounding region. Therefore, the 
hospital can more effectively care for the most seriously ill or injured.  
The ACF is designed as a community-based, modular inpatient 
care system to receive triaged patients from the Virginia Hospital Center (VHC) and the 
Community Care Station (CCS) that meet standardized criteria for admission. 
The ACF, as a supplementary medical care facility, will provide 
low acuity inpatient care. The ACF will not be able to treat patients who require an 
advanced level of care that includes critical/intensive care or life support. The ACF will 
not have access to the necessary equipment or trained staff to provide this level of care. 




Virginia Hospital Center. Detailed plans for establishment, activation, staffing and 
operating the ACF are presented in Appendix 8. Tables 4 and 4a provide a list of 
potential services offered at the CCS and ACF. 
 40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41 
VII. USE OF VOLUNTEERS DURING EMERGENCIES  
Over the last decade, two major volunteer programs emerged at the federal level: 
Emergency Systems for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals 
(ESAR-VHP),27 and the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC). Both these programs are a 
direct result of 9/11 when thousands of spontaneous volunteers also known as unaffiliated 
volunteers, merged on the disaster scene and area hospitals in an effort to assist victims of 
the 9/11 disaster. The overwhelming number of spontaneous volunteers complicated an 
already overburdened response system, which caused health officials to focus efforts on 
providing housing, sanitation, and food for the volunteers.  
Prior to 9/11, no systems of coordination existed across the nation to verify the 
identities, license, and credentials of spontaneous health volunteers willing to work 
within the hospital structure.  
Although the American Red Cross existed as the premier of volunteer 
organizations in humanitarian aid and disaster relief, it served as a conduit of donor funds 
and blood products in the aftermath of 9/11. 
The aftermath of 9/11, and more recently, Hurricane Katrina, revealed a gap in 
hospital preparedness. The need to identify, recruit, credential and train health care 
volunteers prior to an emergency became a focus of Congress.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Experience has shown that in an emergency, overwhelming numbers of health 
care workers are eager to volunteer their services. However, hospitals and emergency 
officials have found it difficult to utilize services of volunteers quickly due to the 
inability to verify identities, license and credentials of the volunteers. As a result, 
volunteers are turned away and services, although sorely needed, are not utilized. 
                                                 
27 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response 
(ASPR), ESAR VHP Grant Program, ESAR-VHP Technical and Policy Guidelines, Standards and 
Definitions-CFDA 93.089, Version 2, June 2005.  
 42 
In 2002, Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act, Section 10728 that mandated that all states and territories 
develop an emergency system for an ESAR-VHP credentialing 
database system. Each of the 60 states and territories received funding 
under the administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response. ESAR-
VHP systems were to be built to a single set of emergency 
credentialing standards and definitions for mutual aid purposes as set forth under the 
ESAR-VHP Interim Technical and Policy Guidelines, Standards, and Definitions.  
The goal was to resolve, in advance, the significant challenges faced when 
seeking to utilize the services of health care volunteers in response to a complex 
emergency situation.  
1. ESAR-VHP Objectives 
• Develop a uniform set of standards across the states to enable the use of 
volunteers for mutual aid  
• Develop a volunteer cadre in support of public health activities 
• Assist hospitals in hospital surge capacity needs by providing lists of 
identified and credentialed volunteers 
• Identify, register and verify the credentials of medical, behavioral health 
volunteers and other professionals prior to an emergency  
• Assign volunteers to one of four resource typing levels based on the type 
of verified credentials 
Although ESAR-VHP is a federal program under the administration of the 
Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response, the program does not receive federal 
liability protections. Each state is responsible for securing liability insurance for its 
volunteers.  
                                                 
28 South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Office of Public Health 
Preparedness, Medical Reserve Corps Volunteer Handbook (Columbia, SC, October 2010). References the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act, Section 107, 2002. 
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2. ESAR-VHP Funding 
In 2005, Health and Human Services (HHS) allocated funding to the states and 
territories in three phases. The first phase funded pilot programs in 10 states. By 2006, 
South Carolina received funding to begin the development of the ESAR-VHP database 
system under the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response Hospital 
Preparedness Program.  
While states were beginning the development of the ESAR-VHP database system 
project, the Medical Reserve Corps program was well underway.  
Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy G. Thompson officially 
launched the MRC program in July 2002. The MRC is a nationally recognized program 
headquartered in the Office of the Surgeon General and administered 
by the Division of Civilian Medical Reserve Corps. The Division of 
Civilian Medical Reserve Corps serves as a clearinghouse that 
provides guidance, technical support, and best practices to the local MRC unit. MRC 
units are housed under separate entities at the local level.  
In 2006, South Carolina applied for Hospital Preparedness funds to develop the 
Medical Reserve Corps. By 2007, South Carolina registered eight MRCs located in each 
of the state health department’s eight public health regions. South Carolina was the first 
state in the nation to provide statewide coverage of the MRC encompassing all 46 of its 
counties. South Carolina utilizes the ESAR-VHP database system to register and 
credential the MRC volunteers. South Carolina’s ESAR-VHP and MRC programs are 
fully integrated under the state agency’s Office of Public Health Preparedness. The state 
health department administers the ESAR-VHP/MRC program. The eight MRCs are 
provided standards of operations, policy structure, and technical assistance at the state 
level under the direction of the Office of Public Health Executive Director and state 
ESAR-VHP/MRC Volunteer Coordinator. 
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Figure 1.  SC MRC Low Country Fall 200929 
 
Figure 2.  SC MRC Midlands Drive Through POD Fall 200930 
Volunteers receive training in the incident command structure and augment public 
health staff in Emergency Support Function (ESF 8) health and medical emergency 
response activities. South Carolina is in the process of expanding the ESAR-VHP/MRC 
program to facilitate South Carolina acute care hospitals’ ability to utilize ESAR-
VHP/MRC volunteers for hospital surge capacity needs. Volunteers are provided tort 
liability coverage through the state health department. However, the state health 
department is unable to provide worker’s compensation coverage due to state laws.  
                                                 
29 Deborah Derrick, SC State Coordinator of ESAR-VHP and Medical Reserve Corps, “South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control,” Medical Reserve Corps Promotional Slides, 
Fall 2009.  
30 Ibid.  
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In 2010, the Division of Civilian Medical Reserve Corps and national ESAR-VHP 
programs partnered to encourage and promote the integration of state ESAR-VHP 
programs and local MRCs across the nation for the registration, verification, and 
credentialing of volunteers.  
B. OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS 
The MRC is a national network of local groups of volunteers committed to 
improving the health, safety and resiliency of their communities. The administration of a 
MRC unit varies and is based on the housing organization and community partners. 
MRCs are housed in a variety of settings including hospitals, local health departments, 
and emergency agencies. MRCs can also register as a 501 c (3). MRCs receive financial 
support through federal, foundation, and business grants, donations and fund-raisers, and 
from the housing agency. Each MRC unit is responsible for providing liability 
protections/insurance for the unit’s volunteers. Over 900 MRC units are registered 
nationwide. Although each unit is unique to the community in which it serves, all units 
share a common criterion: the need to recruit volunteers, train members, create policies, 
procedures, and conduct unit evaluations.  
MRC units are managed by a MRC Unit Coordinator, and operate and deploy as a 
self-contained unit within the Incident Command Structure response system. MRC 
volunteers include medical health professionals and paraprofessionals interested in 
strengthening public health infrastructure and improving the preparedness response 
capabilities of their local jurisdiction. MRC units identify, screen, train and organize the 
volunteers and utilize them to support routine public health activities, community health 
initiatives, and preparedness and response efforts.  
The Division of Civilian Volunteer MRC provides technical assistance in the 
registration and establishment of a unit. Each unit must adhere to a set standard of criteria 
to become a registered unit. The Division of Civilian Volunteer MRC promotes 




guide for the local MRC volunteer. The office’s activities include strategic planning, 
policy development, program operations, grants management, contract oversight, and 
deployment operations.  
• Mission: MRC Nationally. Engage volunteers to strengthen public health, 
emergency response and community resiliency 
• MRC Vision: Public Health Resiliency 
C. CASE STUDIES  
Three MRC’s operation plans were reviewed to analyze the differences between 
the organizational structure, administrative functions, recruitment, training plans, and 
liability protections. The first MRC program reviewed is located in the Hampshire 
County Medical Reserve Corps.  
Hampshire County MRC belongs to a coalition of Medical Reserve Corps and 
Public Health and Emergency Preparedness Departments serving the western 
Massachusetts counties of Berkshire, Franklin, Hampshire and Hampden. Key partners 
include the Hampshire County Health Department, the Local Emergency Planning 
Committee, and Hampshire Memorial Hospital. Three MRC units are located within 
Hampshire County, which adhere to a uniform standard of operations as set forth under 
the Hampshire County Massachusetts MRC Policy and Procedure Manual.31  
1. Hampshire County Massachusetts Medical Reserve Corps Policy and 
Procedure Manual—March 2008 
The plan is developed into four main sections: 1) program overview, 2) volunteer 
relations, 3) volunteer activation, and 4) administration.32 
The program overview section describes the history, mission and purpose of the 
policy and procedure manual. The purpose of the MRC units revolves around three key 
areas. 
                                                 
31 Medical Reserves Corps, Hampshire County, Massachusetts Medical Reserve Corps Policy and 
Procedure Manual, March 2008. 
32 Ibid. 
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1. Public Health Emergencies—events that threaten public health, such as a 
disease outbreak, or toxic chemical release 
2. Mass Casualty Incidents—disasters that cause injury or threats to large 
numbers of people that can include a building collapse, fire, storm, flood, 
or other events that displace groups of residents who must be moved to 
emergency shelters 
3. Community Service Activities—opportunities to foster the well-being of 
local residents; such as health fairs, blood pressure clinics, or training 
programs33 
The goals of this MRC plan are similar to many MRC plans across the nation. 
They primarily want to recruit, enroll and train medical and paraprofessionals volunteers 
while maintaining a database of volunteers. The Hampshire County MRC provides web-
based registration and hard-copy applications. It does not utilize the state-based ESAR-
VHP database credentialing system but hopes to integrate with it in the future. 
The other goal is to provide training and volunteer opportunities on a regular 
basis, so that the volunteers can stay committed and involved in the volunteering process. 
The protocol of operation is structured under the National Incident Management System 
and Incident Command System. Volunteers are required to take ICS 100 and 700 in 
accordance with the Surgeon General’s core competencies. 
The next area of volunteer relations describes different levels of involvement 
described in a Tier 1-3 system: basic, active, and a team leader level. Eligibility of 
readiness of service usually involves background checks, license and certificate 
verification, MRC identification badge, specialized training, and confidentiality forms.  
The administrative section of the plan includes accountability, volunteer 
management, conflict management, performance standards, disciplinary procedures, and 
volunteer dismissal.  
The plan emphasizes the fact that the volunteers are NOT a first responder 
organization and do not have the capability to respond within minutes of an event. The 
MRC is structured to support local response efforts after the initial assessment has been  
 
                                                 
33 Hampshire Co Mass MRC P and P Manual, 2008. 
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conducted by the Incident Commander and needs identified. Activation of the MRC can 
be in response to a large-scale emergency or for a non-emergency activity and is up to the 
discretion of the MRC Unit Coordinator.  
The Hampshire County MRC provides a list of state and federal laws prescribing 
different liability protections, most of which are immunity from liability for negligence 
protections. However, it is unable to offer worker’s compensation coverage for 
volunteers.  
Volunteers are used in several avenues in the Hampshire County MRC. Recent 
activities in the last several years indicate that they have participated in a statewide 
disaster drill and utilized the West Virginia Responder Emergency Deployment 
Information (WVREDI) to contact volunteers and to test response time. They have also 
exercised their call down list, and have participated in county/regional tabletop exercises, 
as well as drive through flu clinics in their counties.34  
2. Central Georgia Medical Reserve Corps  
The housing agency for the Central Georgia Medical Reserve Corps is the North 
Central Health District—one of 18 public health districts in Georgia. The Central Georgia 
MRC is under the governance of an Executive Committee. A larger steering committee 
provides oversight to the executive committee. The Central Georgia MRC Unit 
Coordinator is under the direction of the executive committee.  
The Volunteer Handbook for Central Georgia35 describes the goal and mission of 
the organization, which is locally based healthcare personnel and whose purpose is to 
augment, assist, and support the existing medical and public health systems during 
disasters and public health emergencies. The MRC includes volunteers from various  
 
 
                                                 
34 Hampshire County Health Department, “Welcome,” March 2012, 
http://www.hampshirecountyhealthdepartment.org. 
35 Medical Reserve Corps, Central Georgia Medical Reserve Corps, Volunteer Handbook (North 
Central Health District: Public Health for Middle Georgia, November 2007). 
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disciplines and paraprofessional volunteers as well. The Central Georgia MRC utilizes 
the state’s ESAR-VHP database system as the registration and credentialing system for 
the verification of the volunteers.  
The Central Georgia MRC may be deployed to assist in large scale—complex 
emergencies or smaller incidents in a single jurisdiction. Volunteers maybe assigned to a 
hospital, public health or a mass care facility to assist and support the facilities staff. The 
intent of the MRC is not to replace or supplant emergency medical response systems, but 
to provide surge capability and to support functions, and help during staff shortages at 
local medical or emergency facilities.  
The Central Georgia MRC is organizationally structured into two divisions: the 
Medical Operations Division, responsible for clinical operations, and Support Services 
Division, responsible for non-clinical support functions. Volunteers are assigned to each 
of the divisions and assigned position descriptions for response and training purposes. 
A physician oversees the operations of the Medical Operations Division. The 
division is comprised of eight units: medical, nursing, dental, allied health, veterinary, 
pharmacy, emergency medical services, and mental health. The leader of each of these 
units must be a licensed professional, and registered and assigned to a specific unit.  
The Support Services Division includes the administrative/finance unit 
responsible for the administration, clerical and financial areas of the division. Also 
included is a logistics unit that covers supply, communication, and transportation.  
Administrative protocol in the Volunteer Handbook36 includes processes for 
volunteer recruitment and selection, identification and badges, volunteer safety, and 
training. A few pages are also included on the liability coverage for volunteers. Like 




                                                 
36 Medical Reserve Corps, Central Georgia Medical Reserve Corps, Volunteer Handbook. 
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1. Personal or bodily injury/workman’s compensation 
2. Damages to the personal property of the volunteer to include wearing 
apparel, prescription glasses and automobiles 
3. Damages from fraudulent or criminal acts for verdict, plea of guilty or a 
pleas of nolo conterdere  
The Georgia Department of Human Resources provides liability coverage to 
individuals who volunteer to assist in an emergency. The insurance policy covers 
volunteers who work without compensation in a volunteer program organized and run by 
a state entity. The volunteer must complete forms for each deployment that describes 
specific duties the volunteer will be performing for that particular response activity. 
Activities from the Central Georgia MRC unit include assisting with school-based 
flu clinics, conducting executive committee meetings, and for 2012, volunteers have 
presented the “Emergency Preparedness for Special Needs”37 to district senior centers, as 
well as have participated in the Basic Life Support for Healthcare Provider Course and 
Heartsaver First Aid Course.38  
3. Mesa County, Colorado “Blueprint Toolkit”39 
The Mesa County Health Department utilizes MRC volunteers in a slightly 
different way than many MRC’s across the country by developing tools and processes for 
using volunteers in hospitals. The Mesa County Health Department, in collaboration with 
Family Health West Hospital and the Mesa County Medical Reserve Corps, has 
developed a program for volunteers to actively match up with rural hospitals during times 
of disaster. An entire toolkit has been designed and published to the web to assist 
hospitals and public health agencies integrate volunteer support into hospital inpatient, 
emergency department, and incident response operations.  
 
                                                 
37 North Central Health District, Public Health for Middle Georgia, “Emergency Preparedness for 
Special Needs,” August 2010, http://www.northcentralhealthdistrict.com. 
38 North Central Health District, “Welcome to North Central Health District,” March 2012, 
http://www.northcentralhealthdistrict.com. 
39 Volunteer Policies and Procedures Handbook, “Blueprint for the Use of Volunteers in Hospitals 
and Rural Medical Centers” (Mesa County, Colorado: Mesa County Advanced Practice Center, 2010). 
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The Mesa County Medical Reserve Corps is housed under the Mesa County 
Health Department. The MRC unit provides support to the health department in public 
health related emergency and non-emergency activities, and to area hospitals to augment 
staff to increase surge capacity. The Mesa County MRC utilizes the state’s ESAR-VHP 
database as the registration and credentialing tool. 
The Mesa County Toolkit is divided into four main sections: 1) identifying and 
organizing partners into a planning team, 2) hospital emergency operations plan 
orientation, 3) establishing a training and exercise program, and 4) just in time training 
for volunteer integration. Each section includes templates designed to assist in 
establishing operations and procedures.  
The toolkit carefully describes administrative procedures, registration and training 
requirements, liability waivers, and dress code recommendations. The toolkit provides 
templates for the development of confidentiality agreements, volunteer legal coverage, 
and incident command structure.  
Volunteers in this MRC have assisted with health fairs, participated in strategic 
planning meetings, and discussed the past present and future mission, goals and activities. 
Volunteers have also assisted with providing basic first aid to the public attending the 
Mesa County Fair, and have assisted with flu clinics in conjunction with health 
departments, and even assisted with blood draws at the Mesa County Health Department. 
An exercise is scheduled with a rural hospital later this spring at which MRC volunteers 
are either players or observers in the exercise. A planned workshop with the rural 
hospitals is also planned, and volunteers will assist with the workshop.40 
Each of the MRC units provide medical and non-medical assistance to the public 
health departments, to the public during large events, such as fairs and flu clinics, and in 
some cases, are paired up with rural hospitals to augment services or exercises as needed.  
                                                 
40 North Central Health District, “Welcome to North Central Health District.” 
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4. Metric 
The following charts indicate the Office of the Surgeon General Core 
Competencies Matrix that describe competency, knowledge, attitude, suggested 
training/tools, and assessment to help MRC units evaluate their degree of success in their 
units. Besides training and licensure verification, the other measure that defines success is 
whether volunteers are deployed during emergency and non-emergent incidents. For 
instance, a train derailment may require more volunteers who have specific skills, and if 
the MRC in the jurisdiction has volunteers ready to deploy, then this situation is defined 
as a successful MRC. The three specific MRC units in this thesis also list activities they 
have been involved in for the last several years, and are required to update this list 
annually. Since training is such a critical element in deploying a volunteer, it makes sense 
to review the Office of the Surgeon General metric with the three specific MRC cases, 
and identify their strengths and weaknesses of each plan. 
Figures 3–5 present the MRC Core Competencies from the Office of the Surgeon 
General.41 Table 2 shows the assessment of the evaluation of success for the three case 
studies. 
                                                 
















Figure 5.  MCR Core Competencies Matrix-Domain #3 Public Health Activities and Incident Management 
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Table 2.   Evaluation of Success 
Central Georgia Medical Reserve 
Corps Volunteer Handbook 
Hampshire County Medical Reserve 
Corps Policy and Procedure Manual 
Blueprint for the Use of Volunteers in 
Hospitals and Rural Medical Centers: 
Volunteer Policies and Procedure 
Handbook 
Mesa County, CO 
Assessment Yes No Assessment Yes No Assessment Yes No 
MRC member has a personal 
and family preparedness plan in 
place 
x  
MRC member has a personal 
and family preparedness plan in 
place 
 x 
MRC member has a personal 
and family preparedness plan in 
place 
 x 
MCR member possesses a 
disaster kit  x 
MCR member possesses a 
disaster kit x  
MCR member possesses a 
disaster kit  x 
Participated in a Psychological 
First Aid training (online or 
classroom) 
x  
Participated in a Psychological 
First Aid training (online or 
classroom) 
x  
Participated in a Psychological 
First Aid training (online or 
classroom) 
x  
Completed IS-100 or equivalent x  Completed IS-100 or equivalent x  Completed IS-100 or equivalent x  
Completed a HIPAA training or 
equivalent  x 
Completed a HIPAA training or 
equivalent x  
Completed a HIPAA training or 
equivalent x  
Participated in a Interpersonal 
communication skills training 
or equivalent 
 x 
Participated in a Interpersonal 
communication skills training 
or equivalent 
 x 
Participated in a Interpersonal 
communication skills training 
or equivalent 
x  
Completed local unit-specific 
training x  
Completed local unit-specific 
training x  
Completed local unit-specific 
training x  
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Central Georgia Medical Reserve 
Corps Volunteer Handbook 
Hampshire County Medical Reserve 
Corps Policy and Procedure Manual 
Blueprint for the Use of Volunteers in 
Hospitals and Rural Medical Centers: 
Volunteer Policies and Procedure 
Handbook 
Mesa County, CO 
Assessment Yes No Assessment Yes No Assessment Yes No 
Direct observation of 
compliance  x 
Direct observation of 
compliance  x 
Direct observation of 
compliance  x 
Volunteer screening x  Volunteer screening x  Volunteer screening x  
Completed IS-700 or equivalent x  Completed IS-700 or equivalent x  Completed IS-700 or equivalent x  
Completed equivalent of one of 
the following courses:  
• IS-100: Introduction to 
the Incident Command 
System 
• IS-100: Introduction to 
the Incident Command 
System for Healthcare 
or Hospitals 




Completed equivalent of one of 
the following courses:  
• IS-100: Introduction to 
the Incident Command 
System 
• IS-100: Introduction to 
the Incident Command 
System for Healthcare 
or Hospitals 




Completed equivalent of one of 
the following courses:  
• IS-100: Introduction to 
the Incident Command 
System 
• IS-100: Introduction to 
the Incident Command 
System for Healthcare 
or Hospitals 




Completed Local Points of 
Dispensing (POD) or Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS) 
training 
x  
Completed Local Points of 
Dispensing (POD) or Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS) 
training 
x  
Completed Local Points of 
Dispensing (POD) or Strategic 




Central Georgia Medical Reserve 
Corps Volunteer Handbook 
Hampshire County Medical Reserve 
Corps Policy and Procedure Manual 
Blueprint for the Use of Volunteers in 
Hospitals and Rural Medical Centers: 
Volunteer Policies and Procedure 
Handbook 
Mesa County, CO 
Assessment Yes No Assessment Yes No Assessment Yes No 
Completed a public health 
training, if appropriate x  
Completed a public health 
training, if appropriate  x 
Completed a public health 
training, if appropriate  x 
For purposes of this Evaluation of Success, Yes =Strength and No=Weakness 
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D. LESSONS LEARNED FROM USE OF VOLUNTEERS DURING 
EMERGENCIES  
These three examples of MRC units from different parts of the county identify the 
uniqueness and vast way volunteers are trained, organized and utilized at a local and state 
level. From the inception of the MRC program in 2002, the program has always 
promoted models that work best for the individual community. No one model of how an 
MRC should be organized or formalized exists. Since the organization structures are 
different, some of the units help support sheltering operations in response to local 
emergencies, while some assist with local school, health clinics, and hospitals to support 
augment efforts with public health and even hospitals. Some MRC units file for non-
profit status, some are based out of county health clinics, while others are based out of 
community organizations. States or counties even link the volunteers with rural hospitals 
to help augment medical services, while others are used during public health clinics or 
response activities. After 10 years of inception, gaps still exist in legal protections, 
mutual aid agreements, use of volunteers crossing state lines, and the concept of paying 
for background checks on all volunteers prior to using a volunteer.  
The weaknesses in each plan indicate the gaps that exist in each of these plans. It 
was a little surprising that the matrix element of direct observation of compliance was a 
weakness for all the plans. It may be that although it is not addressed specifically in the 
Policy and Procedure plans, the Just in Time Training also includes a supervised 
observation of the volunteer doing a task assigned. The other surprise was that the 
disaster kit was a weakness in two of the three plans along with the weakness of having a 
personal/family preparedness plans addressed in the Policy and Procedure plan. Each of 
these Policy and Procedure Manuals evaluate the unit as a whole, and do not address 
individuals within the MRC unit. Some of the elements of measure may be addressed in 




1. South Carolina Model for Use of Volunteers During Emergencies 
Lack of hospital surge capacity is still a problem 
- Anthony Kimery42 
South Carolina is listed in the top fifteen states that could possibly run out 
of hospital beds during a pandemic.  
- Trust for America’s Health43  
Reports “93% of South Carolina’s hospitals would be at or exceed bed 
capacity for five weeks into a pandemic.”  
- Trust for America’s Health44 
After reviewing the models and the Policy and Procedure Plans, the model that 
South Carolina most closely aligns with is the Volunteer Policy and Procedure Manual 
from Mesa County, Colorado. This program uses volunteers in county rural hospitals and 
is quite similar to the planned movement of South Carolina in using volunteers in a 
public health setting to augment acute care hospitals with their surge capacity.  
In 2010, competitive grants (a total of 18–30) in the nation were available through 
ESAR-VHP. The award range was from $50,000 to $200,000 per grant year. The state of 
South Carolina was awarded a competitive ESAR-VHP grant for three consecutive years. 
The grant’s requirements focused on meeting compliance requirements, support training 
and exercises, as well as the establishment of working relationships with external 
partners, and so forth. The premise behind the grant was to expand the capacity of the 
state volunteers by having hospitals draw from the SCSERV database to provide them 
with a list of verified and credentials licensed professionals willing to volunteer during 
the time of an emergency with a hospital.  
                                                 
42 Anthony Kimery, “Preparedness for Catastrophe Lax; Complacency Rises,” HSToday.us, January 
12, 2010, http://www.hstoday.us. 




The grant was called ESAR-VHP Acute Care Hospital Surge Project. The grant 
had three main objectives to achieve in three years.  
1. Strengthen local and state coordination for the management and utilization 
of volunteers in South Carolina’s acute care hospitals during an 
emergency.  
2. Strengthen ESAR-VHP/MRC volunteers’ ability to provide surge capacity 
for SC acute care hospitals.  
3. Align SCSERV system capabilities with identified surge capacity needs of 
the acute care hospitals in South Carolina.45 
The premise behind the grant was to expand the capacity of the state volunteers 
by having hospitals draw from the SCSERV database to provide them with a list of 
verified and credentials licensed professionals willing to volunteer during the time of an 
emergency with a hospital. Although the SCSERV system can verify and credential those 
licensed professionals in the State of South Carolina Labor, Licensing and Regulation 
Boards, an individual hospital would still need to provide privilege rights within the 
hospital doors. Hospitals still have the final responsibility to use their own system to 
check the volunteers so that they are comfortable with them entering and volunteering in 
their facilities.  
Table 3 is a proposed model of competencies that need to be addressed and 
answered before the volunteer program is fully operational in South Carolina. The model 
competencies for South Carolina are based on the objectives set by the state for the grant 
and cover training, exercises, and a revamping of the current SCSERV license database 
used by the state when volunteers register into the system. These competencies need to be 






                                                 
45 ESAR-VHP ACHES Grant Narrative, SC DHEC and USC CHEP, June 30, 2010. 
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Table 3.   Competencies 
Competencies Yes No 
Develop Training Needs Assessment   
Offer trainings in Psychological First Aid/Austere    
Conditions   
New Release of SCSERV system   
Test SCSERV   
Exercise SCSERV   
 
This specific grant project is currently in the third and final year of funding and 
will be completed mid-2013. The goal is to have met the objectives of the grant and have 
a cadre of licensed medical professionals who have volunteered, trained and exercised 
with a rural hospital so they can augment the hospital during times of need. Much work is 
still to be done before the hospitals can activate and deploy volunteers to hospitals, which 
includes incorporating these policies and procedures into hospital and public health 
emergency operation plans, as well as staffing plans. South Carolina may serve as a 
model of partner engagement for other states. 
2. Conclusions 
Although much work still remains that needs to be completed on a national level 
with the MRC program, the local and state chapters also have challenges that could affect 
future enrollment and deployment of volunteers in the MRC program. A few conclusions 
follow that are based on discussions at the national level, as well as coordination and 
processes that need development at the local and state level. 
1. Partnerships between local Red Cross chapters and other recognized 
associations with the local MRC should be developed to be implemented 
prior to disasters or emergencies.  
2. Agreements with local agencies should be developed and formalized so 
volunteers can be used either by the local/state public health officials or be 
used to augment rural hospitals with volunteers who are verified and 
credentialed licensed professionals.  
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3. Processes for local jurisdictions to request and utilize MRC volunteers 
from outside their local areas should be delineated in advance of an 
emergency.  
4. Legal protections for the volunteers still need to be identified, which 
include workman’s compensation issues, personal liability, professional 
liability and lost wages.  
The MRC program has traditionally been part of the umbrella services under the 
Hospital Preparedness Program, but beginning July 1, 2012, the capability is included in 
both the HPP and the CDC programs. This realignment in focus and definition will assist 
in the coordination of identification, recruitment, registration, credential verification, 
training and engagement of volunteers to support the public health agency’s response to 
incidents. This crosswalk of resources and focus should help address the needs that still 
exist in the MRC program.  
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mass casualty events present healthcare facilities with the challenge of surge as 
patients suddenly arrive in need of medical attention, which is beyond their normal 
system capacity.  
This thesis has examined state and public health medical surge plans to identify 
practices and evaluate their best ideas regarding surge. Healthcare facilities have the 
unique challenge of preparing for large numbers of patients from arriving at their doors, 
and the need to know their response partners before the disaster strikes. 
Medical surge planning not only examines parameters of seeing numbers of 
triage, patient flow and numbers of patients, but also included such factors as hospital 
budgeting, emergency plans, patient monitoring, and use of volunteers during an 
emergency, equipment, training and exercises.  
A few recommendations follow that hospitals, especially EDs, can incorporate 
into their facility planning.  
• Emergency Planning 
Hospital plans should be compatible with national standards, and follow elements 
of the National Preparedness Guidelines of planning, response and recovery. This process 
needs to start with a hospital HVA done on the facility. This HVA is the basis for 
emergency planning based on the hospital’s situational elements. For instance, if a 
facility is near the east coast and is prone to hurricanes, then its highly ranked 
vulnerability is hurricanes, and planning should be directed to either prepare to shelter in 
place, or evacuate. It also means that hospitals must allocate role and responsibilities to 
all sections of the healthcare facility for a system approach to disaster mitigation. 
Coordination of Operations (COOP) planning is increasingly important to a facility so it 
can recognize which services would be restored quickly after a disaster. Hospitals must 
also plan for affected factors, such as electricity, water, telephones, and the water supply. 
The Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) is one element of planning that cannot 
be overlooked. It should be compatible with the national Emergency Management 
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System (EMS) and the local structure. Some emergencies can be handled within the 
hospital and do not require state or federal interaction, but protocols for each staff should 
be developed and communicated with staff to provide a coordinated response regardless 
of the size of the incident. Hospitals can also not plan in a vacuum. Other sectors of 
emergency preparedness need to be involved in the planning for a mass casualty event. 
Partners to consider would be the Division of Emergency Management, County 
Emergency Planners, public health, EMS, first responders and private companies that 
provide utilities, ice, and other vendors.  
Procedures for surge planning should also include elements, such as the discharge 
of less acutely ill patients, the cancellation of elective procedures, the addition of extra 
beds to wards and rooms, the setting up of cots in open spaces, procedures to call back 
staff for extra shifts, as well as maintaining or increasing stocks of equipment, supplies, 
and pharmaceuticals. This tiered approach to planning also includes the need for 
agreements with healthcare facilities to share staff and equipment based on MOUs, 
logistical systems to coordinate and distribute equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals, 
and the ability to call up volunteers identified as willing and able to provide assistance to 
the facility. Alternate care sites need to be identified for additional space for treatment, 
while still having standards of care outside the normal settings in place. Transportation 
plans should also be in place and must be updated and be able to track patients.  
• Training and Exercises 
As seen in the best practices from both state and public health, training and 
exercises are the most effective means of capacity building, and should be included in 
every plan a hospital produces. Lessons can be learned from countries, such as Israel, that 
has a very robust training and exercise schedule for all hospitals within its country. Israel 
conducts training with its preparedness community on a regular basis, and all hospitals 
follow a three-year cycle of exercises. During the first year, hospitals practice responding 
to a mass casualty event, while during the second year, they practice responding to a 
toxicological or chemical event, and then during the third year, the hospital addresses a 
weakness or area of interest for that particular facility. In addition to these exercises, each 
hospital each year is drilled for a biological event, such as SARS, the pandemic 
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influenza, or anthrax. The drills/exercises are coordinated with the Ministry of Health and 
work closely with the hospitals from the planning stage to the execution of the exercise, 
and then, analysis of the exercise.  
The training and exercising does not stop with the facility. Each healthcare 
worker is required to take part in annual trainings that includes paramedics, physicians, 
and nurses. In fact, in Israel, emergency room shifts can pay more, and in reality, 
physicians can earn an average of 60% of their salary through emergency work. Although 
the United States is not advanced regarding physician and healthcare training, progress is 
occurring through trainings being made available for staff. Therefore, much more can be 
offered, and as such, interest in emergency preparedness and emergency training is 
increasing. Training should be evaluated at regular intervals. Staff should be updated 
annually, and the update listed in the employees’ evaluation. Training helps ensure its 
quality, as well as the ability to adjust the course structure as needed.  
• Communication  
After an exercise, communication is listed as the one factor that needs to be 
improved during a mass casualty incident. Redundant communication systems need to be 
explored to extend communication beyond the hospital staff to include EMS, first 
responders and public health. Hospitals still need the ability to have advanced capabilities 
for EMS and ambulances to know the location to pick up patients and transport them to 
hospitals. Communication systems may not need to be the latest in technology, but they 
must be able to work no matter the situation. The saying goes that technology is great 
when it works. The more important factor is that it is reliable under all situations and 
weather conditions. The increased pressure and expectations of the public also make it 
more challenging for healthcare facilities to instruct the public on clear, concise messages 
during an emergency. Public anxiety, rumor control, and true information are desperately 
needed by the facility to communicate with the public. The hospital spokesperson should 




These recommendations should be included in every individual hospital 
emergency plan in the state of South Carolina and other states across the nation. 
Although the nation has come a long way since 2001 regarding hospital preparedness, 
much work still needs to be done at all levels of the healthcare system. Locally, hospitals 
must ensure they possess up-to-date emergency plans with a well-developed HVA, and 
also address factors that influence their ability to see mass casualties in their hospital. 
Hospitals also need to ensure they engage the community with concise communication 
and direction to families. The use of continued training and exercising, and the constant 
ability to communicate with the first responders are the factors that greatly affect the 
medical surge plan and will help guide the hospital to the ability to see and treat large 
numbers of patients in the time of a disaster.  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
For the want of a bed, a hospital was lost, 
For the want of a hospital, the community was lost, 
For the want of a community the region was lost, 
For the want of the region the Nation was lost, 
And all for the want of a hospital bed.46 
 
The results of the best practices show that hospitals in South Carolina should 
adopt and implement an emergency preparedness plan in their hospitals that reflects an 
all hazards approach to planning. Hospital surge capacity (planning, preparedness, 
response and recovery) begins with a single hospital bed. By incorporating the hospital 
preparedness program’s capabilities, a hospital will be better prepared to handle large 
numbers of patients during a mass casualty event. The ED is the point of entry for both 
emergency and lower acuity patients. A hospital cannot afford to shut down due to the 
lack of preparedness or inability to decontaminate patients prior to entering the hospital. 
Hospitals are the vital link in the multi-faced approach to emergency preparedness 
and medical surge. Their role in this challenge is to provide healthcare while maintaining 
a safe, clean environment for both employees to work in and patients to receive care. 
Although the United States does have challenges concerning emergency preparedness, 
the hospitals in this nation have certainly become more prepared since 2001 and the 
attacks on this nation. The common theme in the state and county plans reviewed indicate 
a continuous need for the constant coordination of resources, communication and 
planning at all levels of the healthcare system.  
Emergency planning and emergency plans also need to be updated annually, and 
healthcare workers need to know their role during an emergency. The time it takes to 
update emergency plans, train, and exercise and update staff is the only way to ensure  
 
 
                                                 
46 Rica Skinner, “Healthcare Preparedness Info Sphere,” Bay State Medical Center, Springfield, MA, 
September 2003, 7. 
 72 
hospitals have taken time to address after action reports, and make every effort to make 
their hospital safer, more efficient, and increase their ability to address the influx of 
patients during a mass casualty event. 
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